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KANT AND SPENCER.
To the Editor of The Opeti Coia-t
:
This is Herbert Spencer's eightieth birthday, and a few of his admirers in this
antipodean city are sending him a congratulatory message, by cable, for we feel
that he, of all English philosophers, has influenced us most.
I have spent part of the morning in reperusing Dr. Carus's pamphlet Kant
and Sfiencer, and I would like to say that it seems to me that Dr. Cams has mis-
apprehended Spencer's criticism of Kant.
Much controversy is raised by the use of the word "intuition". I do not think
Spencer meant by that word anything different from that which Dr. Carus means
He uses "forms of intuition" to mean just what Dr. Carus calls "pure intuition.'
The word "intuition" may not be the best translation of " Anschauung", but it is
the English word used by various translators and commentators. See Meiklejohn's
Translation p. 24, Max Miiller's p. 23, Vol. H. Watson Kant and his E)ig-lish
Critics, G. Croom Robertson's Elements of General Philosophy, and others.
I think that perhaps Alfred Fouillee in his Histoirc de la Philosophie puts
the question plainer. He says, pp. 397 and 398, " D'apres cela, qu'est ce que I'es-
pace et le temps ? Des conditions de notre sensibilite, sans lesquelles nous ne pour-
rions rien percevoir, des raoyens par lesquelles nous emissons nos sensations en
series regulieres, . . . Ce sont, dit Kant, des moules on cadres dans lesquels les
choses viennent prendre la forme qui nous permet de nous les representer; ce sont,
en un mot, les 'formes de la sensibilite'." Indeed, Meiklejohn's and Max Miiller's
translations, which almost agree in this respect, word for word, put it thus, so far
as Space is concerned : "It (Space) is nothing else than the form of all phenomena
of the external sense, that is, the objective condition of the sensibility, under which
alone external intuition is possible."
According to Kant, as Croom Robertson has well said, " The human mind
brings to the result of pure sense-experience certain subjective factors, viz., (i)
pure intuitions {reine Anschauung-), in order to perception; (2) pure categories of
concepts, in order to understanding; (3) pure ideas, in order to reason." These are
transcendental and a priori. Now the criticism of Mill, Bain, and Spencer, not to
mention others, on this position of Kant is, that these are not transcendental nor a
priori.
According to Spencer, to take " Space and Time", they have been derived by
"accumulated and consolidated experiences", not in the individual alone but
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through heredity. To quote the words of Spencer in his Essay " On Space-Consci-
ousness", published in Mind:
" It must also be pointed out that since on the evolution-hypothesis, that con-
sciousness of Space which we have lies latent in the inherited nervous system and
since, along with those first excitations of the nervous system which yield rudimen-
tary perceptions of external objects, there are produced those first excitations of it,
which yield the rudimentary consciousness of the Space in which the objects exist
— it must necessarily happen that Space will appear to be given along with these
rudimentary perceptions in their form. There will necessarily very soon result
something like that inseparability which the Kantists allege. Hence we cannot ex-
pect completely to decompose into its elements the Space-consciousness as it exists
in ourselves."
It will be seen from this extract wherein the difference between Kant and Spen-
cer in this question lies. According to Kant the forms of Space and Time have not
been derived from experience. According to Spencer they have been so derived.
Both recognise that the " forms", so to speak, exist. To use Dr. Carus's happy ex-
pression they are "at-sights", but their " whence and how" is the question. How
have these moulds, if I may use another expression, come to us ? There they are,
like the mould of the linotype-machine into which the molten lead of experience dis-
appears, but how were these moulds formed ? As a thorough-going Evolutionist
Spencer says they are the product of ages of experiences. {Z&e.\\\s PsycJiology , 2. ed.)
The only quarrel that one might have with Spencer is that at first sight it might
appear that Space and Time, as forms of sensibility, are confounded with the ab-
stract idea of Space and Time ; a careful perusal of his Psychology will show, how-
ever, that he did not so confound them (p. 360, Vol. II, Psyc]iology). It is plain, I
submit, from his Essay I have quoted, that he rightly appreciated Kant's position.
I do not think Dr. Carus has quite apprehended Spencer's position when he says
that Spencer believes that Kant said " that Space and Time have no application in
the world of objects (i. e., the non-ego)." Spencer puts his position thus: "To
affirm that Time and Space belong to the ego, is simultaneously to affirm that they
do not belong to the non-ego." Again : "The Kantian doctrine not only compels
us to dissociate from the non-ego these forms as we know them, but practically for-
bids us to recognise or suppose anyforms for the non-ago ". I do not know if a
Kantian would object to this statement, save in the words I have italicised. The only
"forms of intuition" Kant mentions as existing in order to perception are Space
and Time. The qualities of things, etc., are not "forms".
I may add, one point in which a Kantian may complain of Spencer is that he
has not recognised that, considering the time in which he lived and his environment,
Kant was an advanced Evolutionist. There are passages in his Antliropology, which
though put cautiously and suggestively, show that he believed that even man was a
product of Evolution. Spencer seems to me, however, to be right in saying that a
thorough-going Evolutionist must seek for the origin of the "forms of intuition"
—
Space and Time— in experience; Kant did not do so. Whether Spencer's view is
accepted or not, it is ( n Evolutionist lines and seems to me the only rational expla-
nation given at present of how these forms arose. John Stuart Mill and Bain suf-
fer from the defects of the old English school — of having developed their psychol-
ogy before the far-reaching results of Evolution — of heredity — were appreciated
This is seen if one refers to James Mill's Analysis of the Human Mind, and is
also apparent if the first edition of Bain's works be perused.
Wellington. N. Z. Robert Stout.
